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Some Laws of Nature are Metaphysically Contingent








My aim is to argue that at least some laws of nature are metaphysically contingent, though perhaps not all are.  This conclusion may seem rather modest.  Let me begin by explaining why it is important.
Laws of nature resemble necessary truths in some respects, but they resemble contingent truths in others. (Throughout this paper, ‘contingent’ and ‘necessary’ will mean metaphysically contingent and metaphysically necessary.) They resemble necessary truths by being extremely resilient under counterfactual suppositions: For the most part, however differently things might have gone, we tend to assume that the laws of nature would still have held. (There may be other respects in which the laws resemble necessary truths that are not reducible to this one, but in this paper I will focus on this one:  By itself, it is enough to make the laws quite impressively ‘necessary-like.’) They resemble contingent truths in that we seem to have no trouble imagining, conceiving of, and even solving physics problems about situations in which nature is governed by a different set of laws, and the actual laws of nature are false. Whatever we say about their modal status, we will face a puzzle: the puzzle of the laws’ apparent contingency if we say that they are necessary, and the puzzle of the laws’ apparent necessity if we say they are contingent.
If the laws are contingent, then the puzzle of their apparent necessity is very tough, and it would be a great advantage for the philosophical theorist to sidestep this puzzle altogether—which she can do if she embraces necessitarianism, the thesis that all of the laws of nature are necessary. Of course, in that case, she must face the puzzle of the laws’ apparent contingency: How could laws of nature—which we can easily imagine to be false—nevertheless be metaphysically necessary? But to this puzzle there seems to be an excellent solution.
Over the past three decades, several philosophers have been developing a theory according to which natural kinds and properties have essential features, including certain relations they stand in; I’ll call these nomic relations. These nomic relations entail​[1]​, but are not entailed by, patterns of coinstantiation among the properties and kinds they relate; laws of nature are facts about which kinds and properties stand in these nomic relations to one another. For example, suppose that it is a law that copper is conductive:  The kind copper then bears a nomic relation to the property conductivity that entails (but is not entailed by) the regularity that every instance of copper has the property of conductivity. Any kind found in any possible world that does not bear this same nomic relation to conductivity could not be copper, since it would lack one of copper’s essential features. Therefore, copper bears this relation to conductivity in every possible world. It follows that in any possible world containing any instances of copper, those instances are all conductive. None of this implies that we can discover a priori that all copper is conductive, for we can come to know the essences of natural kinds and properties only through empirical investigation. But it does imply that it is necessary that all copper is conductive—since there can be no member of the kind copper in any possible world that fails to bear the property conductivity.​[2]​
Following [Ellis 2001], I will call this view of the metaphysics of laws, kinds and properties scientific essentialism. (Other defenses of scientific essentialism—not all of which use that name—include [Swoyer 1982], [Bigelow, Ellis and Lierse 1992], [Ellis and Lierse 1994], and [Bird 2004; 2007].) Scientific essentialism seems to imply necessitarianism.​[3]​ But this implication is merely apparent; I will argue that in fact, we have excellent reason to believe that if scientific essentialism is true, then there are some laws of nature that are contingent. Yet, it seems clear that scientific essentialism represents the only way in which the laws could be necessary—for, given their logico-mathematical and conceptual contingency, and that they do not concern the identities of things, the only thing that could ground their necessity would be the essential features of the entities they concern, namely natural kinds and properties. This makes the conclusion inescapable that at least some laws of nature are contingent.

II. The Counterfactual Resilience of Laws

Laws of nature seem similar to necessary truths in their extreme counterfactual resilience; had other things been different, the laws would still have been true. But what other things, and how different?  ‘Any other things, and as different as you like’ seems a good answer. But it is clearly too strong. Suppose it’s a law that all copper is electrically conductive; what if my coffee mug were made entirely of electrically insulating copper?  In that case, not all the laws would still have been true. But so what?  No truth, no matter how impressively resilient it is, can be such that it would still have been true even if something else that is incompossible with it had been true.​[4]​ The next best thing would be for all the laws to be true under any counterfactual supposition that is metaphysically compossible with them all—in other words, for the laws to be stable in the sense that:

LS 	For any A that is metaphysically compossible with all of the laws of nature, and any law of nature L: Had it been the case that A, L would still have been true. 

This principle has been discussed and defended at length by Lange [2000; 2005a; 2009]. He argues that it captures the intuitive sense in which laws ‘support counterfactuals.’ It also seems to capture the idea that laws enjoy a kind of necessity (weaker than metaphysical necessity), and to explain the laws’ explanatory power.  (He also notes that in order to avoid certain problems, we have to be careful in the way we formulate the principle that laws are counterfactually stable; LS is a relatively sloppy formulation of the idea.​[5]​ But Lange’s reasons for preferring more subtle formulations are not directly relevant to the discussion at hand, so I’ll keep things simple by sticking with LS.)
I won’t assume here that Lange is right about all this. But I do claim that it is plausible that LS is true​[6]​, and that it captures much of what we call the laws’ ‘modal character,’ and much of what seems to be distinctive about laws. At any rate, even if there were nothing more to the special status of the laws than their stability as expressed by LS, that would be enough to make them very special, and it would be enough to render it a challenging puzzle how any contingent truths could be like that. Should we discover reasons to think that what LS says of the laws is true of the laws together with the Xs—reasons to think that the laws together with the Xs form a counterfactually stable set—that would give us reason to think that the Xs are in fact among the laws. At any rate, it would give us reason to think that the Xs resemble necessary truths in the same way laws do, so the problem of laws’ apparent necessity applies to the Xs as well.

III. Scientific Essentialism and the Nearly-Newtonian World

Scientific essentialism holds that natural kinds and natural properties have essences which include certain relations among them. The laws of nature are the facts about which kinds and properties stand in these relations to one another. It seems to follow that laws must hold of metaphysical necessity, since their truth belongs to the essence of the kinds and properties they concern.
Let us suppose that ours is a Newtonian world. This supposition will be in play throughout the rest of this paper. It simplifies things enormously. I hope it will be obvious that none of my arguments work in a way that depends on this simplification.
The property mass is related to force in the way expressed by the law of universal gravitation:






where  is the mass of x,  is the mass of y,  is the distance from x to y, and G is the gravitational constant which is equal to 6.67 x .

This belongs to the essence of mass, which means that any property, in any possible world, that cannot be substituted for mass in UG salva veritate, is not the same property as mass.​[7]​
But it seems to be perfectly conceivable that UG is false and that some other law governs the attractions of bodies. For example, it is conceivable that UG is false and UG* is true, where UG* is exactly like UG except that in place of the constant G, it contains the constant G*, which is equal to 7.00 x  We can imagine, and conceive of, and solve physics problems about worlds in which the gravitational law is UG* rather than UG. A nearly-Newtonian world seems like a genuine possibility. Had God preferred to create one instead of our actual Newtonian world, what could have stopped her?  Yet, according to scientific essentialism, UG is metaphysically necessary, and UG* is impossible. How could this be? 
Borrowing a strategy from Kripke, the scientific essentialist can reply as follows.​[8]​ Nearly-Newtonian worlds are indeed possible. But they contain no masses. The objects that populate those worlds have a property that is very similar to mass. But this property cannot be identical to mass, since it lacks one of mass’s essential features. When we describe such a world, and reason about what things in it are like, it is only natural for us to speak of the ‘masses’ of the nearly-Newtonian particles in it, and to say that the behavior of these particles is inconsistent with the Newtonian law UG. But this is a misdescription. The property of bodies in the nearly-Newtonian world, such that those bodies attract one another by a force proportional to the product of their values for this property, is not properly called ‘mass.’ It is a distinct property; let’s call it ‘mass*.’ When we think we are conceiving of a world where massive particles gravitate according to UG* instead of UG, we are really conceiving of something else—namely, a world where massive* particles gravitate according to UG*—and we commit the forgivable error of misdescribing that world. Since nothing has mass in a nearly-Newtonian world, UG is vacuously true in any such world. Any world that contains massive objects is a world where mass has all of its essential properties, and so is a world where UG is true; any world that contains no massive objects with mass is a world where UG is vacuously true. So UG is true at all metaphysically possible worlds, despite the possibility of the nearly-Newtonian world.​[9]​

IV.  Role Properties and Q-Laws

Scientific essentialism does not imply that laws are metaphysically necessary truths by itself. It does so only with the help of an additional assumption: that our terms for natural kinds and properties, such as ’mass,’ are rigid. Suppose that instead, ’mass’ were non-rigid, referring to different properties in different worlds. In particular, suppose that in the nearly-Newtonian world, it picked out mass*. In that case, UG would be false in the nearly-Newtonian world, so it would not be necessary. Let’s grant for the sake of argument that ’mass’ and other common natural-property terms found in scientific theories are indeed rigid.
Nevertheless, we can introduce a non-rigid term that picks out mass in our world, but picks out mass* in the nearly-Newtonian world. For example, we could define ‘the massy property’ as the natural property that, among all of the instantiated natural properties, plays the causal-nomic role most similar to the one played by mass in the actual world. So, in the actual world (or any other Newtonian world), the massy property is mass, but in any nearly-Newtonian world, the massy property is mass*. (In some worlds, there may be no single property that plays the causal-nomic role most similar to that of mass; there, ‘the massy property’ picks out no referent.)  
We can now introduce the following proposition, which results from substituting the massy property for mass throughout UG:






where  is the massy property of x,  is the massy property of y,  is the distance from x to y, and G is a constant which is equal to 6.67 x ; kg is a standard unit for measuring the massy property.

At our world, where the massy property is mass, Q-UG is true just in case UG is. Hence, Q-UG is true at our world. But at any nearly-Newtonian world containing at least two bodies, Q-UG is false. Therefore, Q-UG is contingent. 
I claim that Q-UG is a law, even though it is contingent. Note that Q-UG shares many of the distinctively law-like features of UG. It supports counterfactuals: If the massy property of my cat were doubled, then so would be the magnitude of the force pulling her toward the center of the earth. For this is a consequence of Q-UG, and Q-UG would still have been true even if my cat’s massy property were doubled. Q-UG also plays a role in explaining its instances which parallels that of UG. For example, if my cat’s mass is only half what your cat’s is, then this fact, together with UG, explains why the force the earth exerts on my cat is only half the force it exerts on your cat. Similarly, if my cat’s massy property is half what yours is, then this fact, together with Q-UG, explains the same thing. 
For these reasons, it is intuitively plausible that Q-UG is a law of nature. Doubts may remain, though. Below, I will present another argument that, by scientific essentialist lights, facts like Q-UG must be counterfactually stable in the same way that laws of nature are, giving the scientific essentialist excellent reason to regard them as laws.
But first, let’s generalize what we have done so far.  First, we can generalize the notion of the massy property into the general notion of a role property. Let P be any natural property; assume that ‘P’ picks out its referent rigidly. Then let’s define the P-role property as the instantiated property that plays the causal-nomic role most similar to that played by P in the actual world. (More colloquially, we can call the P-role property ‘the P-y property’ or ‘the P-ish property,’ depending on what is most phonetically pleasing—thus, we have the chargy property, the temperaturish property, and in biology we find the sexy property.)  For any natural kind K, we can define the K-role kind (the ‘K-y kind’ or the ‘K-ish kind’) similarly.
Now we can generalize the idea of the law Q-UG.  According to scientific essentialism, the paradigm of a law of nature is the proposition (or fact, or state of affairs) that property (or kind) P stands in a nomic relation to property (or kind) R—where P and R are both getting picked out rigidly. Let’s call any true proposition (or fact, or state of affairs) of this form an N-law. Every such N-law entails the regularity that everything that instantiates P also instantiates R​[10]​; let’s count these regularities entailed by N-laws as N-laws themselves. Given scientific essentialism, all N-laws are metaphysically necessary.​[11]​ Now consider a proposition that is just like an N-law except that one (or more) of the properties or kinds that figure in it is picked out non-rigidly, as a role property. It follows immediately that such a proposition is true in the actual world, but may be false at some other possible worlds. I will call any such proposition a Q-law. Scientific essentialism implies necessitarianism only with the help of the additional assumption that only N-laws can be laws of nature. My task here is to argue that, given the rest of the scientific-essentialist picture, Q-laws must be laws of nature as well.
It will be helpful to introduce one more concept here. In our world, the massy property is mass, the matterish kind is matter, and so on. These facts are obviously true, and perhaps they can be known a priori. But obviously, these facts are metaphysically contingent; mass* plays the role of the massy property in the nearly-Newtonian world, XYZ plays the role of the watery kind in the worlds of certain famous thought-experiments, and so on. I will call all of these facts the role-filler facts.

V. Laws, Counterfactuals, and Scientific Essentialism

Suppose that scientific essentialism is correct in what it says about the nature of natural kinds and properties, and about laws’ being constituted by nomic relations among them. Further suppose that the laws of nature just are the N-laws. Then we can rewrite LS thus:

NLS 	For any A that is metaphysically compossible with all of the N-laws​[12]​, and any N-law of nature L: Had it been the case that A, L would still have been true. 

But in order to explain the relation between laws and counterfactuals, it is not enough for a scientific essentialist to endorse NLS; they will have to make a further assumption.​[13]​
To see why, consider the following counterfactual, which I will call ‘the Statues Counterfactual’:

The Statues Counterfactual   If there were two statues in this room, then they would exert attractive component forces on one another and the magnitudes of those component forces would be given by the equation in UG. 

The Statues Counterfactual is the very model of a law-supported counterfactual. Given our Newtonian laws of nature, we should all happily affirm it, and we should all happily affirm that it is true in virtue of the ‘necessary-ish’ character of the laws, together with the fact that UG is one of the laws.
But the Statues Counterfactual is not a consequence of NLS. Its antecedent meets the condition set in NLS; there is presumably nothing inconsistent with any N-law in the supposition of a pair of statues in this room. So NLS does imply that had there been such a pair of statues, then every N-law would still have been true. So, if the statues had had mass, then they would have attracted one another according to UG. But if there had been a pair of statues here, would they have had mass?  Of course they would have!  But it is not a consequence of NLS that they would have. As far as NLS has to say about the matter, if there had been a pair of statues in this room, then they might not have had mass at all; the world might have been nearly-Newtonian rather than Newtonian, in which case the statues would have had mass* instead of mass.
It may be tempting to reply: ‘What we should have said to begin with was that if there had been two statues in this room, and those statues had had mass, then they would have exerted attractive component forces on one another and the magnitudes of those forces would have been given by UG.’ But this would be a mistake. If I had struck this match, it would have lit. Of course, it would not have lit if there had been no oxygen in the room. But this does not show that what I really should have said to begin with was, ‘If I had struck this match and there had still been plenty of oxygen in the room, then it would have lit.’ I don’t need to say all that, because in fact, if I had struck the match, there would still have been plenty of oxygen (as [Goodman 1954] explained). Just so, in the present case: We do not need to burden the Statues Counterfactual by adding the qualification ‘and they had mass’ to its antecedent. For if there had been two such statues, then they would have had mass. There is no need for us to append this as a conjunct to the antecedent. (A similar point is made by [Lange 2004: 231].)
It might be objected that NLS does, after all, imply the Statues Counterfactual. The worry was that if there had been two statues in this room, perhaps they might have lacked mass; NLS, at any rate, does not seem to rule this out. But what if matter is a natural kind with an essence, and part of this essence is that everything made of matter has mass (and not, for example, mass*)?  In that case, any two statues made of matter would have to have had mass. But this doesn’t quite solve our problem. For what if the statues had not been made of matter; what if instead they had been made of matter*, which is the mattery kind in the nearly-Newtonian worlds?  In that case, the two statues would indeed have exerted attractive component forces on one another, but the magnitudes of those forces would have been given by the equation in UG* rather than that in UG. 
But is it metaphysically possible for statues to be made of matter* rather than matter? Well, why not? Statue is not plausibly construed as a natural kind. (That’s why I picked an example about statues, rather than, say, cats or electrons.) And even if statue-hood has an essence, it is very implausible that this essence includes being made of matter (rather than some other kind of mattery stuff); it would be churlish to refuse to call the works of art made by nearly-Newtonian sculptors ‘statues’ on the grounds that they are made of matter* rather than matter. So it seems that we still have no argument that shows that the Statues Counterfactual is true.
Of course, we know that if there had been a pair of statues here, the universe would still have been Newtonian; the stuff that things are made of would still have been matter rather than matter*; the statues would have had mass and so they would have attracted one another in accordance with UG. My point here is just that this obvious truth is not a consequence of NLS. It is not a consequence of NLS because it is not an N-law (and more generally, it is not a necessary truth) that the universe is stocked with matter rather than matter*. But NLS is what the idea that the laws of nature are counterfactually stable comes to, assuming that the laws of nature are just the N-laws. So, if we want to explain why counterfactuals like the Statues Counterfactual are true, it won’t do just to point to NLS. We need to make a further assumption, which goes beyond NLS, in order to explain why some law-supported counterfactuals are true.
What should this further assumption be?  Well, why are we so confident that the Statues Counterfactual is true, despite the worries posed above?  We feel confident that if there had been two statues here, then there would still have been things with mass, and there would still have been nothing with mass*. Indeed, there would still have been mass but no mass* pretty much no matter how things had been different otherwise. And more generally, we feel quite confident that pretty much no matter how things might have been different otherwise, the place of mass would not have been taken by any Döppelgänger property—in other words: the massy property would still have been mass.
This is extremely plausible. It is equally plausible that the same thing goes for every other natural kind and natural property: The watery kind would still have been water; the chargy property would still have been charge; the P-ish property would still have been P—no matter how things had otherwise been different, insofar as this is metaphysically possible. All of the role-filler facts would still have remained in place, however things might have been different otherwise—so long as the way in which they were different is metaphysically compossible with the role-filler facts themselves.  But that is just to say that the role-filler facts form a stable set. In other words:

RFFS For any A that is metaphysically compossible with all of the role-filler facts, and any role-filler fact F: If A had been true, F would still have been true.

RFFS and NLS together account for the truth of the Statues Counterfactual, and apparently would account for any similar counterfactual that we might construct. Indeed, it is plausible that the scientific essentialist can use these two principles to explain why pretty much all of the counterfactuals we take to be supported by laws of nature should be true. But if we do not assume the truth of RFFS, it seems that NLS will not be enough to explain why all of the counterfactuals that we would ordinarily think of as ‘supported by the laws’ are true, for the reasons we have just seen. So, the scientific essentialist has a compelling reason to affirm RFFS. ​[14]​

VI. The Lawhood of the Q-Laws

What we have seen so far is that, assuming that the metaphysical thesis of scientific essentialism is true, the counterfactual stability of the N-laws is not enough to account for the truth of all of the law-supported counterfactuals; in order to account for their truth we must affirm the principle RFFS (which is plausible on its own merits anyhow). This turns out to have an important consequence.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that scientific essentialism is true, and let U be the closure under entailment​[15]​ of the set of actual role-filler facts.  U is thus metaphysically equivalent to the set containing all and only the actual role-filler facts; each set entails the other. It follows at once that if either set is counterfactually stable, then so is the other. So by RFFS, U is a counterfactually stable set:

US   For any A that is metaphysically compossible with all of the members of U, and any fact F that belongs to U: If A had been true, then F would still have been true. 

Note that since U is closed under entailment, it includes all metaphysically necessary truths, so in particular it includes all of the N-laws.  From the N-laws, together with the actual role-filler facts, we can logically deduce all of the actual Q-laws.  To see why, consider a particular Q-law, such as Q-UG. Now suppose that all of the actual role-filler facts are true.  In particular, then, mass is the massy property. Since UG is a metaphysically necessary truth, UG is true. But UG, together with the fact that mass is the massy property, logically implies Q-UG. Therefore Q-UG is true. There is nothing special about UG or mass here, so the argument generalizes: From the truth of all the N-laws and all the role-filler facts, we can deduce all of the Q-laws.  But the N-laws and the role-filler facts belong to U, and U is closed under entailment, so it is closed under logical deducibility.  Therefore, the Q-laws belong to the set U.
So U is a set of truths that includes the Q-laws as well as the N-laws.  We have seen that it is counterfactually stable, in Lange’s sense:  Every one of its members would still have been true, under any counterfactual supposition that is metaphysically compossible with them all. This is, as a matter of logic, the most stable under counterfactual perturbations that any given set of truths can be. So the members of the set U are collectively ‘necessary-ish’ in the way that the laws of nature are. The members of U, that is, enjoy the modal character that characterizes the laws of nature.




I have argued that even if the scientific-essentialist metaphysics of natural kinds and properties is correct, there are metaphysically contingent propositions (namely, the Q-laws) that share the counterfactual stability distinctive of the laws of nature.  A necessitarian scientific essentialist might reply that this does not establish conclusively that the Q-laws are laws of nature; at most, it establishes that the Q-laws share one important feature with the laws of nature.
But this reply would not be reasonable. What gives us our initial purchase on the concept of a law of nature, prior to any philosophical theorizing about it, is the range of things that seem to be clear cases of laws (according to our best theories), and the roles that laws seem to play in our reasoning. Both give us ample reason to include the Q-laws as well as the N-laws among the laws of nature. For recall that the only difference between a Q-law and its corresponding N-law is that the Q-law picks out properties by means of descriptions of their causal-nomic roles while the N-laws picks them out by means of rigid names. In scientific practice, it is doubtful that this difference ever makes a significant difference: Scientists want to know whether neutrinos have mass and whether electric charge is always conserved; if you can give them that information, it seems unlikely that they will care (or even notice) whether you do so while picking out neutrino-hood and charge by means of rigid designators or not. Moreover, we have seen an argument that Q-laws are just as counterfactually robust as N-laws are. In short, each Q-law seems to carry pretty much the same weight as its corresponding N-law, and thus seems to have as much prima facie claim to lawhood. If we nevertheless deny that Q-laws are laws of nature, on the grounds that they are metaphysically contingent, this amounts to begging the question in favor of necessitarianism. 
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^1	  Here and throughout, ‘A entails B’ means that it is metaphysically necessary that if A, then B.
^2	  Which fact here is the law of nature—that all instances of copper are conductive, or that the kind copper stands in a nomic relation to the propery conductivity? For purposes of my discussion here, it will make no difference; both are necessary truths according to scientific essentialism, and as I hope to show, the laws of nature include truths that, unlike both, are contingent.
^3	  Bird [2005: 442-3] observes that a scientific essentialist might hold that either all laws are metaphysically necessary or that only some are.  He notes that the former view seems preferable since only it can offer a unified philosophical account of all laws of nature; if only some laws are necessary, then we need separate accounts of why the necessary laws play the role of laws (supporting counterfactuals and the like) and why the contingent ones do.  If my argument succeeds, then the preferable view is not an option; essentialists are stuck with a disunified account of how laws do their jobs.  To anticipate a bit:  On the “unified” option represented by necessitarianism, the scientific essentialist can explain the counterfactual resilience of all laws by saying that they are all metaphysically necessary, and metaphysical necessities must be counterfactually resilient.  By contrast, on the “disunified” option, some of the laws depend for their counterfactual resilience on the counterfactual resilience of what I will call the role-filler facts.  The role-filler facts are metaphysically contingent.  So on the first option, the counterfactual resilience of all laws can be given a unified explanation in terms of the counterfactual resilience of all necessary truths; on the second option, by contrast, the counterfactual resilience of at least some laws cannot be thus explained, since it depends also on the counterfactual resilience of some contingent truths. 
^4	  What about metaphysically necessary truths? They are an exception just in case every metaphysically necessary truth would still have been true under any metaphysically impossible counterfactual antecedent. Lewis’s [1973] possible-worlds semantics implies that this is so, since it implies that any counterfactual whose antecedent is true at no possible worlds is automatically true. But this is a very implausible consequence. Assume that it is metaphysically necessary that water is H2O. What if there had been an ocean filled with hydrogen-free water—would water still have been H2O? The answer seems clearly to be no: In that case, water (logically) could not have been any compound of hydrogen at all, so it would not have been H2O. This example makes it plausible that the claim just made in the test applies to all truths, even metaphysically necessary ones.
^5	  For example, as it stands, LS implies that if it had not been a law of nature that momentum is always conserved in closed systems, then nevertheless momentum would still have always been conserved. But this conditional is not clearly true. A suitably refined version of LS would avoid this problem; see [Lange 2000: 47-8].
^6	 Subject to the qualifications alluded to in the preceding note. I assume here that we can set aside Lewis’s [1979] argument that if determinism is true then some law would have been false under just about any counterfactual supposition. For criticism of that argument, see [Carroll 1994: 185-9]; [Lange 2000: 73-7]; [Roberts 2008: 228-42].
^7	  I use ‘property’ to refer not only to all-or-nothing properties and relations, but also to quantitative properties (and relations), which can be thought of as functions from objects (or n-tuples of objects) to numbers.
^8	  [Kripke 1980: 150-1]. This reply borrows only a general strategy from Kripke; I do not mean to suggest that Kripke would endorse the reply, or scientific essentialism itself.
^9	  Alternatively, a scientific essentialist might deny that the nearly-Newtonian world represents any metaphysical possibility at all, whether the objects in it have mass or mass*. (See [Ellis 2005: 75-6].)  But the case in favor of the possibility of a nearly-Newtonian world stocked with mass* seems to be quite strong: The nearly-Newtonian gravitation law is extremely similar to the Newtonian law, differing from it only in the numerical value of a constant; with mass* in place of mass, this law is not inconsistent with anything’s possession of its essential features, so far as we know. Do we ever have better reason to believe in the metaphysical possibility of a conceivable but non-actual situation than when (i) it is extremely similar to a situation we know to be actual, and (ii) there is no identifiable reason to think it impossible?
^10	  Or some more complex relation of coinstantiation between P and R, depending on the nature of the particular nomic relation that P and R stand in.
^11	  Objection: What if it is an N-law that P is nomically related to R, but there is a possible world where neither P nor R even exists? In that case, it seems that there is a possible world where one of the actual N-laws is false. To deal with this objection, all we need do is stipulate that the N-law ‘P bears nomic relation N to R’ should be construed as shorthand for the material conditional: ‘If P and R both exist, then P bears nomic relation N to R.’ This makes N-laws vacuously true at all worlds where the properties they relate do not exist. (Similarly, the regularity that all Ps are Rs is vacuously true at any world—if there are any—where P, though existent, is uninstantiated.)
^12	  Equivalently:  For any A that is metaphysically possible.  (Since the N-laws are metaphysically necessary.)
^13	 This point is also made by Lange, who further argues that whatever further assumption the scientific essentialist might make here, it would be ‘unprincipled’ and ‘ad hoc’ [Lange 2004: 228]. Thus, Lange concludes, the scientific essentialist cannot explain why the law-supported counterfactuals are true without resorting to unprincipled, ad hoc measures. In reply to Lange’s argument, [Ellis 2005] and [Handfield 2005] both argue that the needed additional assumption is quite plausible on principled grounds and is not at all ad hoc. I am inclined to agree with Handfield and Ellis here. As will become clear, my point is not that the essentialist is not entitled to the additional assumption, but rather that this assumption implies that there are metaphysically contingent laws.
^14	 Ellis himself seems to accept RFFS; see [Ellis 2005: 76].
^15	  Recall that by “A entails B” I mean that it is metaphysically necessary that if A, then B.  So for all P, P belongs to U just in case P is true in every metaphysically possible world where all the actual role-filler facts are true.
^16	  And so do the role-filler facts—though some might balk at calling them ‘laws’ since they do not take the form of generalizations or regularities.
